Voters will resist 10-day CPN-Maoist banda

NOV 04 -

Former Home Secretary Umesh Prasad Mainali oversaw the drafting and implementation of the state’s security plan during the 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) election. As incidents of violence continue to rise across the country as November 19, the scheduled date for the second CA election, nears, Manish Gautam andPranaya SJB Rana spoke to Mainali about existing security challenges, the threat posed by the CPN-Maoist and gaps in the Home administration’s security plan.

How has the security situation changed since the 2008 CA elections?

Back then, only about 500 of over 2,000 security bases were intact and that too at district headquarters. Most of our time was spent in trying to reinstate those bases. The Madhes Movement had also just happened and there were a large number of armed groups operating in the Tarai. Furthermore, directly before the elections, former Maoist combatants, who were confined to cantonments, would come out of their camps with weapons, spread terror and then go back in. Due to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, we were not allowed to take administrative action against them. Now, the challenges are very different. Security bases are intact and the administration has a large number of security personnel on the ground. We conducted the 2008 CA elections with just 40,000 Nepal Police and 20,000 Armed Police. Now, roughly 50,000 Nepal Police, 29,000 Armed Police and 60,000 Nepal Army personnel are being mobilised. The number of armed groups in the Tarai has reduced significantly and are not active. But there is also a sizeable political force—the CPN-Maoist—that is actively opposing the election process. The party’s recent activities—felling trees to create blockades, burning vehicles—show the risk they pose.

How should the state deal with the CPN-Maoist without escalating violence?

The security agencies must become proactive. This does not mean that the party should be forcefully suppressed but its violent activities need to be controlled and stopped. This is a technical response that the security forces need to take if elections are to be held at all. But looking at the CPN-Maoist politically, its Pokhara meet endorsed a boycott of the election. Despite their claims of being neglected by the four major parties, their actions show that it would have been extremely difficult to bring them into the election process, which has now already come so far. Millions of rupees have already been spent; ballot papers have been printed; the Army and police have set up their temporary camps; and all election offices have opened. So it is not possible to go back now. But it is the political parties—not the government—that need to think about how to include the CPN-Maoist when the time comes to write the constitution. The CPN-Maoist’s voice will need to be heard.

The CPN-Maoist has called a 10-day banda starting on November 11. Do you think the party has the capacity to enforce a banda for this long?

If recent trends are anything to go by, I do not think a 10-day banda can be enforced. A banda for that long would destroy people’s lives. The people will not take this. Just look at the recent example of the banda called on Teej by the UCPN (Maoist). The people are not stupid; in fact, they are far ahead of the political leaders. But more than that, the people are now mentally prepared for the election. They are already talking about who to reward and who to punish at the ballot. So it is impossible to completely disrupt the election process. The Baidya Maoists must realise this. In a democracy, they have the right to boycott the election. But they need to convince us of this. They cannot use violence and they cannot take away our sovereign democratic rights.

Given the improved security situation compared to 2008, was it necessary to mobilise the Nepal Army in its current capacity for this election?

It was necessary to mobilise the Army as it had always been deployed for elections prior to the 2008 CA election. But they were mobilised as a last resort, to transport logistics and for aerial support. This time, the Army is being mobilised in a different manner. It will be acting as the third security perimeter for voting booths in districts that have been categorised as ‘sensitive’ and ‘most sensitive’ by the Home administration. I don’t, however, know the level of threat the administration saw but I am doubtful that the Army needed to be deployed in this manner. It would have looked better if the Army had been been formed into quick response and mobile teams. I am uneasy with the fact that the Army will be interfacing with the people directly; this is not an emergency. It is natural for the general public, especially in rural areas, to perceive some kind of threat upon seeing the Army standing around with guns. Based on my experience and my own feeling as a citizen, I do not think it was wise to deploy the Army for booth-level security.

Looking at recent incidents of violence across the country, do you think the government’s security plan is adequate?

The administration’s risk mapping needs to be immediately reviewed. Recent incidents show that the administration’s catergorisation of districts is flawed. While they took into account the CPN-Maoist and the armed groups that are present in the Tarai and the Eastern hills, they seem to have failed to consider the youth wings of the parties. Because these party cadres are young, they are emotional and believe that their party needs to win at any cost. There is a problem of coordination too. The Army wants to follow its own chain of command. This will make things much more difficult. What if the Army doesn’t respond to civilian authority, to orders from the Chief District Officer (CDO)? What if it seeks orders from its own chain of command during critical times? Who will be accountable then? Second, there is a legal problem. The Army has been mobilised according to the Local Administration Act, which gives the authority to take action only to the CDO, not the Home Minister, not the Home Secretary and not the Army leadership. But if the Army is seeking its own command and control, then what becomes of the Local Administration Act? This can definitely cause complications.

A number of senior Nepal Police officials, including the Inspector General himself, will be retiring just five days before November 19. As the Nepal Police is the primary security agency, how will this affect poll security?

There are certainly internal institutional ways of dealing with this. Such crucial positions will not be left vacant. But the problem here is that Deputy Inspector Generals (DIGs) posted in the districts are more focused on their promotion. They are not concentrating on the election and are instead awaiting the Cabinet decision that will promote one person to IGP in place of Kuber Singh Rana. Right now, the election is in the campaign phase and there are high possibilities of inter-party conflict between candidates and cadres. The DIGs should be concentrating on their regions and focusing on how to manage such conflicts. Instead, their attention is on the centre.

On a different note, the Limbuwan area in Eastern Nepal has a history of violence. What are some specific security concerns here?

In the last election, we thought that there was a potential for violence in districts east of the Arun, which is the Limbuwan area. So we established a number of temporary police posts there and that prevented many acts of violence in the run-up to and on election day itself. Now, some of the former armed groups from that area and those demanding a separate Limbuwan state are in Mohan Baidya’s 33-party alliance. So it looks like they are following the strategy of the CPN-Maoist, like with their obstruction of Prachanda’s election campaign. Inter-party clashes during election time are natural. No matter how tight security is, such clashes will definitely occur. The problem here is that violent activities are taking place frequently and suddenly. There is a tree blocking the road here or there is a bomb over there. These kinds of incidents are extremely dangerous and to control them, we need better intelligence and more proactive policing.

Finally, are there any outstanding security challenges that have yet to be identified?

There is the issue of police personnel who have deserted their posts and that of the ex-Maoist combatants. These two groups might be small in number but they are skilled in using weapons. They are capable of doing anything and can be hired by anyone. This threat requires sustained policing. There are two kinds of threats—real and perceived. Real threats can be identified and minimised; perceived threats are feelings and thus, harder to alleviate. But perceived threats directly impact the voter’s decision to go out and cast their vote. They affect voter turnout and this can directly affect the legitimacy of the election. To reassure the voter, there must be vigorous patrolling from the police. They need to be seen on the streets. Perpetrators of violent activities must be immediately caught and prosecuted. This will let voters know that they will be safe when they go to cast their ballot and also when they return home.